The increasingly assertive rhetoric from Addis Ababa, combined with military movements and fraught regional diplomacy, has created a tinderbox where a miscalculation could spark a devastating conflict. At the heart of the crisis is Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed “irreversible demand” for direct sea access for his landlocked nation of 120 million people, a demand that his government says is essential for economic survival but one that Asmara views as an existential threat.
The current friction is rooted in a complex and bloody shared history. After the colonial era, Eritrea was incorporated into the Ethiopian Empire. A three-decade war for independence ended in 1993 with Eritrea secession, but peace was short-lived. A bitter border war from 1998 to 2000 killed tens of thousands and left relations frozen for a generation.
A brief thaw came in 2018 when Abiy Ahmed took office, initiating a reconciliation that earned him the Nobel Peace Prize in 2019. The two nations became unlikely allies during the brutal Tigray War from 2020 to 2022, joining forces against the common enemy of the Tigray People Liberation Front. However, that alliance has since shattered, and the relationship has deteriorated faster than many analysts predicted.
“The risk of conflict between the two countries remains quite high,” said Michael Woldemariam, an associate professor at the University of Maryland School of Public Policy. “We can say with some confidence that the tension and animosity between the two governments has become much more explicit over the last couple of months and weeks.”
The central point of contention is Abiy vigorous campaign for a seaport. As the world most populous landlocked country, Ethiopia relies almost entirely on the port in Djibouti for its imports and exports, a dependency that costs an estimated USD 1.5 billion to USD 2 billion annually—a drag on an economy already struggling with debt and inflation. Abiy argues this economic bottleneck is unsustainable.
His solution has been to publicly and persistently demand sovereign or guaranteed access to a Red Sea port. While he has mentioned peaceful negotiation, the ambiguity of his methods has set off alarm bells, particularly in Eritrea, which fears the target is the port of Assab, located just 75 kilometers from the Ethiopian border.
These fears were stoked in mid-October when high-ranking Ethiopian military and intelligence officials visited the border town of Bure, a flashpoint during the 1998-2000 war that sits on the main highway to Assab. The high-profile meeting was interpreted by many as a strategic signal, intensifying concerns that Addis Ababa might be considering a military option.
Despite the fiery rhetoric, several factors may restrain Ethiopia from launching an all-out invasion. The country military is already stretched thin, fighting insurgencies in several regions, including Amhara, where a potent rebellion has proven difficult to quell.
“Right now, the fight in the Amhara region has proven to be a very challenging one for the Ethiopian army,” said Abdurahman Sayed, a UK-based expert on the Horn of Africa. “In these circumstances, I think going to war against Eritrea may not be a wise step to be taken.”
This view is echoed by Bayisa Wak-Woya, a former UN diplomat of Ethiopian origin, who also highlights the legal ramifications. “In theory, anything can happen but, personally, I don’t think there will be an outright war… beyond the ongoing verbal war,” Wak-Woya said. “If Ethiopia does that against Eritrea, just to gain access to Assab, it is illegal.”
Abiy himself has attempted to walk this fine line, assuring lawmakers in late October that he has “no intention of going to war with Eritrea,” while in the same breath reaffirming that Ethiopia demand for sea access is non-negotiable. “I am a million times sure that Ethiopia will not remain a landlocked country,” he declared to parliament.
Recognizing the international implications, Abiy has stated he has discussed the port issue with global powers including the United States, Russia, China, and blocs like the African Union and the European Union. However, finding a credible mediator is a challenge.
The African Union, headquartered in Addis Ababa, is the natural forum, but it has a “chronic problem” in addressing continental conflicts, noted security expert Sayed. He pointed to Ethiopia recent memorandum of understanding with the breakaway region of Somaliland—a move widely seen as violating the AU charter on colonial borders—as evidence of the body limited influence.
The role of the United States is also uncertain. Researcher Woldemariam suggested an engaged Washington could pressure both sides, but noted that “the Trump administration is regarded as a somewhat unpredictable actor at the current moment, not necessarily reliable.”
Meanwhile, Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki is not sitting idle. In late October, he traveled to Cairo for a five-day working visit, courting Egypt, a traditional regional rival of Ethiopia. The two nations already have a major point of contention in the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on the Nile. For Egypt, stability in the Red Sea is a paramount national interest.
“The Red Sea for the Egyptians is as important as the River Nile,” explained Sayed. “The income they get from the Suez Canal… if there are any problems on the southern entrance of the Bab el-Mandeb, then their income would be affected.” He cited the recent 40% drop in revenue following Houthi attacks in the Red Sea as a clear precedent.
Looming in the background are Ethiopia next elections, due in 2026. The port issue is a powerful nationalist card that resonates across the political spectrum. While some observers believe Abiy is secure in his position, the populist appeal of regaining sea access is undeniable.
Wak-Woya believes the issue is here to stay. “The issue of Assab will never disappear from the political arena,” he said, touching on a sentiment common among older Ethiopians. “There are many… who still can’t absorb the fact that Eritrea is no more part of Ethiopia.”
This lingering historical grievance, combined with present-day economic imperatives and the personal ambitions of two deeply entrenched leaders, has created a crisis with no easy exit. While a full-scale war is not a foregone conclusion, the escalating war of words, military posturing, and complex geopolitics mean that the fears of conflict in the Horn of Africa are more real than they have been in years. The international community watches, hoping that the path of diplomacy can prevail over the drumbeats of war.
The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Who Owns Africa.
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