ExxonMobil is quietly tightening its grip on procurement for the Rovuma LNG project in northern Mozambique, instructing subcontractors to steer clear of politically connected firms it believes could bloat costs and paralyze decision-making — a signal of how seriously the U.S. oil major is taking the risk of derailment on one of Africa’s most consequential energy developments.
At the center of the tension is Mozambique’s state-owned energy company, Empresa Nacional de Hidrocarbonetos (ENH), which holds a 10 percent stake in the Area 4 concession that underpins the project. According to sources familiar with the matter, ExxonMobil has moved to limit ENH’s influence over contractor and supplier selection below the primary contract layer — a step the company views as essential to preserving procurement integrity and timelines.
The American supermajor’s concern is straightforward: in megaprojects of this scale, the insertion of politically affiliated intermediaries into the supply chain has historically produced cascading delays, inflated invoices, and contractual disputes that can bleed billions from a budget. With a final investment decision (FID) targeted for 2026 and first liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports penciled in for 2030, ExxonMobil has little appetite for that kind of friction.
Rovuma LNG — Key Facts
- Location: Afungi Peninsula, Cabo Delgado, northern Mozambique — Area 4 of the Rovuma Basin
- Estimated project value: $30 billion
- Target capacity: 18 million tonnes per annum (mtpa), up from original 15.2 mtpa
- Partners: ExxonMobil (25%), Eni (25%), CNPC, ADNOC/XRG, KOGAS, ENH (10% each)
- EPC Lead: JGC / Fluor / TechnipFMC consortium (onshore); FEED by McDermott / Saipem / CPECC
- Force majeure lifted: November 20, 2025
- FID target: 2026 | First LNG: 2030
ExxonMobil lifted force majeure on Rovuma LNG in November 2025, more than four years after an Islamic State-affiliated militant attack on the town of Palma in April 2021 forced a suspension of work. The lifting was a milestone, but it did not dissolve the layers of risk that continue to shadow the project. Security in Cabo Delgado, analysts note, remains managed rather than resolved, and cost inflation pressures — already a global headache for LNG developers — are acute in a country with limited infrastructure and a thin local supply base.
“In projects of this magnitude, the supply chain is where political risk shows up first — and where it hurts most.”
It is against that backdrop that ExxonMobil’s procurement stance takes on added significance.
The company has structured its contractor guidance in a way that specifically flags firms with links to politically exposed persons (PEPs) — a category that, in a resource-rich but governance-challenged country like Mozambique, tends to overlap uncomfortably with companies connected to ruling-party networks or state entities. By asking subcontractors to vet their own suppliers and partners against these criteria, ExxonMobil is effectively extending its compliance perimeter well beyond its own direct contracts.
ENH’s position as a 10 percent stakeholder in the Mozambique Rovuma Venture (MRV) — the joint venture that controls Area 4 — does not automatically give the state company influence over operational procurement decisions. ExxonMobil, as delegated operator for the onshore LNG facilities, retains that authority. But state energy companies in sub-Saharan Africa have long used their stakeholder status to advocate for preferred local suppliers, sometimes successfully. ExxonMobil, it appears, is trying to foreclose that avenue before it opens.
The move is unlikely to sit easily in Maputo, where the government has made local content a centerpiece of its LNG narrative. Mozambique’s authorities are still reviewing an addendum to the Rovuma development plan, including a revised budget, and the project’s ultimate green light remains contingent on regulatory approval. That gives the government leverage — and makes ExxonMobil’s procurement posture a delicate diplomatic balancing act.
The International Institute for Sustainable Development estimated in 2023 that Mozambique could earn between $35 billion and $63.6 billion in fiscal revenues over the lifetime of its LNG projects — but only starting in the early to mid-2030s. For a country that is one of the world’s poorest, the math of patience is hard. Any delay, including one caused by procurement gridlock, pushes that revenue horizon further out.
ExxonMobil has redesigned the Rovuma plant to comprise 12 modular liquefaction trains of 1.5 mtpa each — a departure from the two large conventional trains originally planned. The modular approach, engineers say, offers better schedule certainty and lower emissions, but it also means a more complex, phased procurement process involving hundreds of suppliers across multiple geographies. Keeping that chain clean of political interference is, in that sense, not just a compliance exercise but an operational necessity.
ExxonMobil CEO Darren Woods said at COP30 in Belém in November that the company intends to “move quickly” on Rovuma LNG as it pursues a target of surpassing 40 mtpa in global LNG sales by 2030. That ambition makes delivering Rovuma on schedule something more than a regional priority — it is a cornerstone of the company’s global energy strategy. The rules being drawn in the procurement room are, ultimately, a reflection of just how much is riding on what gets built on the Afungi Peninsula.
