In the scorched streets of El Fasher, capital of North Darfur, survivors sift through rubble after the Rapid Support Forces takeover late last year, recounting mass killings and ethnic violence that have turned the city into what United Nations aid workers called a crime scene. Accusations fly that foreign arms — sophisticated Chinese weaponry re-exported via the United Arab Emirates — fueled the paramilitary advance, deepening a civil war that has killed tens of thousands and displaced millions.
This catastrophe in Sudan exemplifies how a deepening rift between Gulf giants Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates is transforming parts of Africa into arenas for proxy competition, prolonging conflicts and complicating fragile regional stability as local actors exploit the divide for weapons and funding.
Latest flashpoint in Yemen
The latest flashpoint came across the Red Sea in Yemen on 30 December 2025, when Saudi warplanes struck the port of Mukalla, destroying a shipment of armored vehicles allegedly bound for the United Arab Emirates-backed Southern Transitional Council. Riyadh called it a defence of Yemen unity; Abu Dhabi denounced it as an assault on its partners, prompting threats of United Arab Emirates troop withdrawal.
Sudan opposite sides in a brutal war
In Sudan, the divergence is stark. Saudi Arabia has positioned itself as mediator, hosting stalled Jeddah talks and backing the Sudanese Armed Forces to preserve central state structures. The United Arab Emirates, repeatedly accused by Khartoum, the United Nations and rights groups of arming the Rapid Support Forces, denies the claims but faces growing international backlash over its alleged role in fueling atrocities.
African analysts warn this external patronage has Sudanized the conflict, allowing both sides to dig in rather than negotiate. “Gulf powers are playing local factions against each other, turning our crises into their chessboard,” said a Nairobi-based Horn of Africa expert, speaking anonymously. The result: over 150000 dead and the world’s worst humanitarian crisis.
Horn of Africa battle for strategic ports
The rivalry extends southward into the Horn, where control of Red Sea and Gulf of Aden ports offers leverage over vital shipping lanes. The United Arab Emirates, through DP World, has invested heavily in Berbera port in breakaway Somaliland, once planning a military base there. This bypasses Somalia central government in Mogadishu, which leans toward Saudi support.
Recent Israeli recognition of Somaliland — not condemned by the United Arab Emirates but sharply criticized by Riyadh — has heightened tensions, seen by some as aligning with Abu Dhabi maritime ambitions while challenging Saudi preferences for regional unity. Somalia has long viewed such deals as violations of its sovereignty, exacerbating internal divisions.
Structural divergence drives competition
At root, the split reflects differing visions. Saudi Arabia prioritizes territorial integrity and stability along its borders, viewing unified states as buffers against instability. The United Arab Emirates pursues a nimble maritime empire, favoring agile partners and decentralized control to secure trade routes and economic footholds.
This break-to-build strategy, evident in backing separatists from Yemen south to Sudan paramilitaries, clashes with Riyadh approach. A late-2025 meeting between Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and United States President Donald Trump reportedly tilted Washington toward the Saudi view, prompting what analysts call Emirati retaliation via proxies.
African leaders navigate the divide
African leaders increasingly voice frustration. Ethiopian officials, eyeing Red Sea access amid their own tensions with neighbors, see Gulf over-militarization as a threat to sovereign corridors. In Somalia, warnings against foreign port deals echo broader fears of fragmentation.
The African Union has called for homegrown solutions, but limited resources hamper mediation. “External rivalries are prolonging our wars and exploiting our divisions,” said an African Union official in Addis Ababa.
No full rupture expected
Despite escalating rhetoric — from airstrikes to diplomatic rebukes — experts doubt a full rupture. Economic interdependence and shared post-oil diversification goals make mutual destruction unpalatable.
Yet the proxy dynamic risks entrenching instability. Local actors, from Sudan warring generals to Horn separatists, play the powers off each other for arms and legitimacy, delaying peace.
As 2026 unfolds, Africa Red Sea coast and conflict zones remain vulnerable. Whether quiet diplomacy prevails or red line confrontations escalate will shape not just Gulf relations, but the continent security and critical global trade routes for years ahead.
The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect Who Owns Africa’s editorial policy.
