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Zambia Election 2026: Why the August 13 vote matters for Africa’s copper powerhouse

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Zambia Election 2026: Why the August 13 vote matters for Africa’s copper powerhouse

Zambia heads to the polls on August 13 in an election that will test President Hakainde Hichilema’s economic record and determine whether his government can turn a copper revival into broader growth, jobs and investment.

Hichilema is seeking a second term after taking office in 2021, when Zambia was emerging from a sovereign debt crisis and had defaulted on its external obligations. Five years later, the economy is in a stronger position, but the recovery remains unfinished.

For investors, the election is about more than who occupies State House. It is about whether Zambia can maintain fiscal discipline, complete its debt restructuring, secure a new programme with the International Monetary Fund and attract enough investment to expand copper production.

Copper is at the centre of that equation. The metal accounts for about 70% of Zambia’s export earnings and more than 10% of gross domestic product, according to Reuters. The government wants to more than triple annual copper production to 3 million metric tons by 2031.

That ambition has made Zambia one of Africa’s most closely watched mining economies at a time when global demand for copper is rising because of electric vehicles, power networks, renewable energy and other technologies.

Hichilema seeks a second mandate

Hichilema, leader of the United Party for National Development, won the 2021 election after defeating then President Edgar Lungu.

The election transformed Zambia’s political landscape and was widely seen as another example of the country’s history of peaceful transfers of power.

The 2026 contest is expected to be dominated by Hichilema and opposition candidate Brian Mundubile of the Tonse Alliance, although several candidates are contesting the presidency. Reuters has described Hichilema as the favourite for a second term, while noting that the election is effectively a referendum on his economic record.

The government can point to important economic gains since 2021.

Zambia has made progress on restructuring its external debt, while mining investment has increased and copper output has strengthened. The IMF estimated that the economy grew by 5.2% in 2025 and projected growth of 5.8% in 2026 in its January assessment.

But the economic recovery has not eliminated pressure on households.

The opposition has focused on the cost of living and economic hardship, issues that could influence voters even as international investors focus on macroeconomic stability.

That creates a central political challenge for Hichilema. His administration needs to convince voters that economic reforms are improving everyday lives while convincing investors that the reforms will continue.

Copper is the election’s biggest economic issue

Few commodities matter to Zambia as much as copper.

The country is Africa’s second largest copper producer after the Democratic Republic of Congo and has become increasingly important in global efforts to secure supplies of critical minerals.

Copper prices have risen sharply over the past year, creating an opportunity for Zambia to attract capital and expand production. Reuters reported in August that copper prices had risen more than 40% over the previous year to around $14,000 per ton.

Mining companies are therefore watching the election closely.

The industry wants clearer exploration rules, stronger infrastructure, reliable electricity, incentives for investment and greater opportunities for local processing. Mining companies have invested more than $10 billion since the 2021 election, according to Reuters.

The government has set an ambitious target of producing 3 million metric tons of copper annually by 2031.

Achieving that target would significantly change Zambia’s economic position. It could increase export earnings, strengthen the kwacha, generate tax revenues and create new opportunities in manufacturing and mineral processing.

But higher production will require major investment.

Zambia needs additional electricity generation, improved roads and railways, more efficient border systems and expanded processing capacity. Reuters reported that the mining sector estimates Zambia needs about 2,000 megawatts of additional power capacity to support its copper ambitions.

The election will therefore be watched closely by mining companies seeking to determine whether the next government will maintain current policies or introduce new taxes, regulations and local content requirements.

The kwacha is another election barometer

The Zambian kwacha has become an important indicator of investor confidence.

Currency movements can affect the cost of imported fuel, machinery, food and other goods, making the exchange rate an issue for both businesses and households.

Investors are watching whether election uncertainty creates renewed pressure on the kwacha or whether a clear result allows financial markets to focus on Zambia’s improving copper revenues and fiscal position.

Reuters reported in late July that Zambia’s currency was expected to remain under pressure around the election period, highlighting the sensitivity of the foreign exchange market to political uncertainty.

The longer term outlook is closely linked to copper.

Higher copper export revenues can increase the supply of foreign currency and support the kwacha. But that benefit depends on production actually increasing and the government maintaining credible economic policies.

A stronger currency would also help reduce imported inflation, although it could create challenges for some exporters.

For investors, the key question is therefore not simply whether the kwacha strengthens after the election. It is whether the currency can be supported by a sustained improvement in Zambia’s external accounts.

Debt remains a major test

Zambia entered the 2020s under severe debt pressure.

The country became the first African sovereign to default during the coronavirus pandemic, setting off years of negotiations with creditors.

The Hichilema administration has since worked with international creditors to restructure billions of dollars of external debt.

The IMF said in January that Zambia had made significant progress with debt restructuring and fiscal consolidation. However, it also warned that public debt remained at high risk of overall and external debt distress.

That means the next government will have limited room for policy mistakes.

Large increases in public spending could undermine investor confidence if they are not matched by revenues or productive investment.

At the same time, excessive fiscal restraint could frustrate voters who expect better public services, more jobs and higher incomes.

The balance will be particularly important after the election.

Zambia needs investment in electricity, roads, health, education and other infrastructure, but it must avoid returning to the borrowing patterns that contributed to the previous debt crisis.

A new IMF programme is in focus

Another major issue for investors is Zambia’s relationship with the IMF.

The country completed its $1.7 billion IMF programme in January, a facility that played an important role in supporting economic reforms and the debt restructuring process.

Finance Minister Situmbeko Musokotwane said in July that Zambia hoped to agree a new IMF programme by the end of 2026. Discussions were expected to continue after the August 13 election.

A new programme would send an important signal to investors.

It could provide a framework for fiscal policy while reinforcing confidence that Zambia will continue implementing reforms.

But the next programme is likely to be different from the emergency support provided during the debt crisis.

Investors want to see policies that support growth, private investment and job creation rather than simply stabilising public finances.

The government will therefore face pressure to demonstrate that Zambia can move from crisis management towards sustainable economic expansion.

Electricity could determine the copper boom

Zambia’s copper ambitions face one major structural obstacle: power.

The country relies heavily on hydropower, making electricity generation vulnerable to drought.

Recent energy shortages exposed the risks of relying too heavily on hydropower. Power disruptions can force mines to reduce production, raise operating costs and discourage new investment.

For a government promising to triple copper production, expanding reliable electricity supply is therefore essential.

Mining companies are calling for more generation capacity as well as improvements to the transmission network. Reuters reported that the sector estimates around 2,000 megawatts of additional capacity will be needed to support the planned expansion.

That could create opportunities beyond mining.

Solar power, transmission infrastructure, battery storage and regional electricity trading could become important areas of investment.

If Zambia can solve its power constraints, copper could become the anchor for a much wider industrial strategy.

Investors want more than copper

Although copper dominates the investment story, Zambia needs to diversify its economy.

Agriculture remains important to employment and household incomes. Manufacturing could benefit from cheaper and more reliable electricity. Tourism has potential because of Zambia’s wildlife and natural attractions, while logistics could expand because the country sits at the centre of several regional trade routes.

The challenge is turning mineral wealth into broader economic development.

A copper boom that creates export revenues but few jobs outside mining would leave Zambia vulnerable to another commodity downturn.

That is why investors are also watching government policies on local suppliers, processing and industrial development.

Reuters reported that investors are interested in whether foreign mining commitments translate into higher production and whether local content requirements can be implemented without discouraging investment.

The next government will have to manage that balance carefully.

Zambia wants more value from its minerals, but it also needs international capital and technical expertise to expand the industry.

Politics and investor confidence

The election also matters because Zambia has built a reputation for democratic stability in a region where political transitions have sometimes been contested.

Recent analysis has nevertheless raised concerns about the use of state institutions, constitutional changes and the treatment of political opponents. Chatham House has urged Hichilema to preserve Zambia’s democratic reputation and resist using state power to gain an unfair electoral advantage.

For investors, political stability is not simply a question of election day.

It affects the credibility of contracts, mining licences, tax policy and institutions.

A peaceful and credible election would help reinforce Zambia’s reputation as a destination for long term investment.

A disputed result or prolonged political uncertainty could have the opposite effect.

The outcome of the parliamentary elections will also matter. A government with strong legislative support could have greater room to implement economic reforms, while a more fragmented parliament could force broader political negotiations.

What happens after August 13

The most important question for Zambia after the election will be whether the country can convert its copper opportunity into sustainable growth.

Hichilema enters the vote with a stronger economic story than the one he inherited in 2021. Debt restructuring has advanced, mining investment has increased and copper prices are providing favourable conditions.

But the risks remain substantial.

The IMF has warned that Zambia’s debt remains at high risk of distress. Electricity shortages threaten mining expansion. The fiscal position requires discipline. Investors remain sensitive to currency movements and political uncertainty.

For ordinary Zambians, the test will be more immediate.

Economic growth needs to translate into jobs, lower living costs and improved public services.

For investors, the test is whether Zambia can maintain predictable policies and turn its mineral wealth into a stronger and more diversified economy.

For Africa, the stakes are even wider.

Zambia is competing for capital in a global race for copper and other critical minerals. The United States, China, Europe and other major economies are seeking secure supplies for energy, transport and advanced manufacturing.

The country therefore has an opportunity that extends beyond its borders.

If Zambia can expand copper production while strengthening institutions, managing debt and investing in electricity and infrastructure, it could emerge as one of Africa’s most important critical mineral economies.

If it fails to address those constraints, the copper boom could remain another missed opportunity.

The August 13 election will decide who leads Zambia into that next phase. But the harder task begins after the votes are counted.

The winner will inherit a country with valuable mineral resources, rising international interest and a chance to reshape its economic future.

The question is whether Zambia can turn copper power into lasting national wealth.

China Africa Trade: 53 African countries gain zero tariff access to China

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China Africa Trade: 53 African countries gain zero tariff access to China

China’s zero tariff policy is opening its vast consumer market to 53 African countries. The move could boost African exports, but turning market access into economic power will depend on production, infrastructure and value addition.

China Africa trade is entering a new phase.

From May 1, 2026, 53 African countries with diplomatic relations with China became eligible for zero tariff treatment across all tariff lines under Beijing’s expanded preferential trade policy.

The move gives African exporters wider access to one of the world’s largest consumer markets. It could create new opportunities for agriculture, manufacturing and processed goods.

The timing is significant.

China Africa trade reached about 1.41 trillion yuan, equivalent to roughly $196.6 billion, in the first half of 2026, according to China’s Foreign Ministry.

That represents a record first half for bilateral trade.

But behind the headline figure is a persistent imbalance. China exports considerably more to Africa than it imports from the continent, while many African economies continue to depend heavily on raw materials and commodities.

The key question is whether China’s zero tariff Africa policy can help change that pattern.

What China’s zero tariff policy means for Africa

The latest policy extends zero tariff treatment to 53 African countries that maintain diplomatic relations with Beijing.

Eswatini is excluded because it maintains diplomatic relations with Taiwan.

China had already introduced zero tariff treatment for 33 African least developed countries in December 2024.

The latest expansion brings another 20 African economies into the arrangement, including several of the continent’s largest markets.

For the newly included countries, the preferential treatment is currently scheduled to run from May 1, 2026 to April 30, 2028.

For exporters, the immediate benefit is clear. Products entering China can avoid import duties, potentially reducing costs and improving competitiveness.

But zero tariffs do not guarantee success.

African exporters must still meet Chinese customs requirements, food safety regulations, product standards and certification rules.

They must also overcome high transport costs and logistical challenges before their goods even reach the Chinese market.

China Africa trade reaches record levels

The tariff changes come as bilateral trade continues to expand.

China Africa trade reached approximately $295.6 billion in 2024, according to Chinese government data.

Chinese exports to Africa were about $178.8 billion, while imports from Africa stood at approximately $116.8 billion.

That left China with a trade surplus of about $62 billion.

The relationship continued to grow in 2026.

Chinese government data showed bilateral trade reached 646.56 billion yuan in the first quarter of 2026, an increase of 23.7% from the same period a year earlier.

By the end of June, trade had reached 1.41 trillion yuan.

The numbers show how important China has become to African economies.

China is a major source of machinery, electronics, vehicles, industrial equipment and consumer products.

Africa, meanwhile, supplies China with oil, minerals, agricultural products and other commodities.

Which African exports could benefit?

Agriculture is likely to be one of the biggest immediate beneficiaries of the new policy.

China has a huge consumer market and growing demand for food and premium agricultural products.

African countries already produce many goods that could find wider markets in China.

These include coffee, tea, cocoa, fruit, nuts, wine, spices and horticultural products.

Kenya, Ethiopia, South Africa, Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire are among the African economies with established agricultural export industries.

The opportunity, however, goes beyond exporting larger quantities.

African businesses can potentially earn more by processing and branding their products before they reach China.

That means exporting roasted coffee instead of only green beans, processed cocoa instead of raw cocoa beans, and packaged foods instead of bulk agricultural commodities.

The bigger opportunity is value addition

For decades, Africa’s trade relationship with China has followed a familiar pattern.

African countries export commodities and natural resources while importing manufactured goods, machinery, electronics and consumer products.

That relationship has generated significant economic activity.

But it has also raised concerns about how much value African economies retain from their exports.

When raw materials are processed elsewhere, much of the manufacturing income and employment is created outside the producing country.

The zero tariff policy creates an opportunity to change part of that model.

African governments and businesses can use greater access to China to expand food processing, mineral refining, textile manufacturing, leather production and other industries.

The objective should be simple: export more value, not just more volume.

Can Africa reduce its trade deficit with China?

The trade imbalance remains one of the biggest challenges in China Africa trade.

In 2024, China exported approximately $178.8 billion in goods to Africa while importing about $116.8 billion.

The gap shows that increased market access alone will not create a balanced trading relationship.

African countries need competitive products that Chinese consumers and businesses actually want.

They also need sufficient production capacity to supply the market consistently.

China is a highly competitive market.

African exporters must compete with producers from Asia, Europe, Latin America and other regions.

That makes quality, price, reliability and branding increasingly important.

Agriculture could lead the next export wave

Agriculture could become a major driver of African exports to China.

The continent has substantial agricultural potential, while China has enormous food demand.

African producers could expand exports of coffee, tea, cocoa, fruit, nuts, wine, meat and processed foods.

The greatest opportunity may be in products that combine African raw materials with local processing.

That could generate more revenue while creating jobs in manufacturing, packaging, transport and logistics.

But African farmers and companies need support to compete.

Reliable electricity, roads, ports, cold storage, financing and quality control systems will be essential.

Without those improvements, tariff reductions may have only a limited impact.

Infrastructure could determine who wins

One of Africa’s biggest export challenges is infrastructure.

A product can enter China without a tariff and still be uncompetitive if it is too expensive to transport from a farm or factory to the port.

Poor roads, congested ports, unreliable electricity and limited storage facilities increase the cost of doing business.

The problem is particularly serious for fresh agricultural products.

Delays can cause spoilage and turn a potentially profitable export into a loss.

This makes infrastructure investment central to the future of China Africa trade.

African governments need to improve transport networks, energy systems, ports, logistics facilities and digital infrastructure.

Businesses also need better access to affordable finance.

The minerals opportunity

Minerals add another important dimension to China Africa trade.

Africa has significant deposits of copper, cobalt, lithium, manganese and graphite.

Many of these minerals are critical to renewable energy, batteries, electronics and modern manufacturing.

China is a major player in global mineral processing and manufacturing.

That creates opportunities for African countries to attract investment and build industries around their natural resources.

But there is also a risk.

If Africa continues exporting minerals in raw or minimally processed form, much of the final economic value will still be created elsewhere.

The long term objective should therefore be processing and manufacturing.

African countries need investment in refining, energy, technology and skills to capture more value from their mineral wealth.

What the policy means for Kenya

Kenya is among the African economies that could benefit from wider access to China.

The country already exports products such as tea, coffee, flowers and horticultural goods.

But increasing exports will require more than simply producing larger volumes.

Kenyan companies need to understand Chinese consumer preferences and build products specifically for that market.

Processing and branding could be particularly important.

A Kenyan company that exports packaged coffee, for example, can potentially capture more value than one selling only unprocessed beans.

The same approach can be applied to tea, fruit, spices and other agricultural products.

For Kenya, the Chinese market could also provide an opportunity to diversify beyond traditional export destinations.

A new opportunity for African businesses

The success of China’s zero tariff policy will depend on whether ordinary African businesses can use it.

Large commodity exporters are likely to benefit first.

But small and medium sized enterprises could eventually have an even greater impact on employment and local economic development.

Many smaller businesses lack financing, market information and the technical capacity required to enter distant markets.

Governments, banks and trade promotion agencies can help close that gap.

They can provide information about Chinese demand, certification requirements, financing and distribution channels.

African businesses will also need to invest in branding and digital marketing.

China should increasingly be viewed not only as a source of imports but as a major destination for African products.

What happens next for China Africa trade?

The expansion of zero tariff access marks an important moment in the economic relationship between China and Africa.

For 53 African countries, tariffs are no longer the same barrier they once were.

But market access is only the beginning.

African countries still need to improve infrastructure, production capacity, financing, quality standards and industrial capabilities.

The real opportunity is not simply to export more to China.

It is to export better products and capture more value.

Africa has the resources, labour and entrepreneurial talent to build globally competitive industries.

The challenge is creating the conditions that allow those businesses to scale.

For decades, the central question in Africa’s relationship with China has been what Africa can buy from China and what China can build in Africa.

The zero tariff policy introduces another question.

What can Africa build and sell to China?

That question could define the next chapter of China Africa trade.

If African economies use the opportunity to expand processing, manufacturing, branding and high value exports, the policy could help reshape Africa’s position in global trade.

If exports remain dominated by unprocessed commodities, the benefits could be far more limited.

China has opened a wider door to its market.

The next move belongs to Africa.

Kenya Election 2027 High court ruling puts Ruto’s political future under pressure

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Kenya Election 2027 High court ruling puts Ruto’s political future under pressure

Kenya’s 2027 election plans face fresh uncertainty after the High Court ruled that the next presidential election could be constitutionally due in 2026 rather than 2027.

The ruling has triggered debate over presidential term limits, the election timetable and the interpretation of Kenya’s Constitution.

It also puts President William Ruto and the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission, or IEBC, under renewed scrutiny.

The IEBC has been preparing for the next general election in August 2027. Its current election operations plan sets Tuesday, Aug. 10, 2027 as the date for the poll.

The court ruling has now introduced a competing interpretation of when Kenyans should next elect their president.

What the court ruling means

The dispute centres on Article 136 of Kenya’s Constitution.

The article provides for a presidential election on the second Tuesday in August every fifth year following the previous election.

Kenya last held its general election on Aug. 9, 2022. Ruto won the presidential contest after defeating opposition leader Raila Odinga.

The latest ruling has raised a key constitutional question.

Does the five year period mean Kenya should hold its next presidential election in 2026, or does the established electoral timetable allow the country to vote in 2027?

The court has not ordered Kenyans to vote immediately.

It suspended the effect of its declaration, allowing the legal process to continue and giving the affected parties an opportunity to appeal.

Ruto therefore remains president while the dispute is considered by the courts.

Why the ruling matters to Ruto

The controversy comes at a critical time for Ruto.

His administration has been preparing for the 2027 political contest while working to strengthen its national political coalition.

A 2027 election would give the government more time to implement its policies, defend its economic record and build support for a second term.

An election in 2026 would change that calculation.

Ruto and his allies would have less time to prepare for the campaign. Political parties would also have to accelerate candidate selection, coalition building and voter mobilisation.

The dispute could therefore affect the strategy of both the government and opposition.

Kenya’s 2027 election preparations

The IEBC has already invested significant effort in preparing for the Kenya 2027 election.

Its election operations plan covers voter registration, political party activities, candidate nominations and polling preparations.

It identifies Aug. 10, 2027 as the scheduled date for the general election.

Changing that date would create a major logistical challenge.

Kenya’s general election includes the presidential race as well as elections for Parliament, governors and county assemblies.

The IEBC would need to review voter registration, ballot preparation, election technology, polling stations, staffing and security arrangements.

An earlier election could also leave less time for testing electoral systems and resolving technical problems.

That makes the court dispute important not only for politicians but also for the credibility of the electoral process.

A bigger constitutional battle

The case is about more than an election date.

It raises questions about how Kenya interprets its Constitution and calculates presidential terms.

Since the adoption of the 2010 Constitution, Kenya’s courts have played an increasingly important role in resolving disputes involving elections and government institutions.

The Supreme Court demonstrated that role in 2017 when it annulled the presidential election and ordered a fresh poll.

The latest case could become another important test of judicial authority.

If the ruling is appealed, higher courts could eventually provide a final interpretation of the constitutional provisions governing the election timetable.

That decision could settle the question of whether the next presidential election should be held in 2026 or 2027.

What happens next

The immediate focus is likely to shift to the appeal process.

The High Court ruling can be challenged before the Court of Appeal. Constitutional questions of national importance could eventually reach the Supreme Court.

Until the legal process is completed, Kenya faces an unusual situation.

The IEBC is preparing for a 2027 election while a court ruling has raised the possibility of an earlier presidential vote.

Political parties will therefore have to watch the courts while continuing their preparations.

Potential presidential candidates may also have to consider both scenarios.

Impact on political alliances

Kenya’s presidential elections are heavily influenced by political alliances.

Since taking office, Ruto has worked to expand his political support beyond his traditional base.

The opposition, meanwhile, has been attempting to build a stronger coalition ahead of the next election.

The uncertainty over the election date could accelerate those efforts.

An earlier election would leave parties with less time to negotiate alliances and select candidates.

It could also force politicians to begin campaigning earlier than expected.

For the opposition, the court ruling provides another opportunity to challenge the government.

For Ruto’s administration, the priority will be to maintain political stability while defending its position on the election timetable.

Why investors are watching

The election dispute also has economic implications.

Kenya is East Africa’s largest economy and an important regional centre for finance, trade and transport.

Investors closely follow political developments because elections can affect government policy, public spending and business confidence.

An unexpected change to the election timetable could increase uncertainty for businesses preparing for the next political cycle.

The government is already dealing with fiscal pressures and difficult economic reforms.

A shortened political timetable could add further pressure to government spending and economic policy.

However, the economic impact will depend largely on the outcome of the legal process.

For now, the ruling has created uncertainty rather than an immediate change to the election calendar.

What it means for Kenya 2027

The central question is whether Kenya will vote in 2026 or proceed with the planned 2027 election.

The answer will ultimately depend on the courts.

The ruling has nevertheless changed the political conversation.

The Kenya 2027 election can no longer be viewed simply as a fixed date on the political calendar. Its constitutional basis is now being challenged.

For Ruto, that creates uncertainty around his second term strategy.

For opposition parties, it creates another avenue for political pressure.

For the IEBC, it presents a difficult planning challenge.

For voters, it raises important questions about presidential terms and the constitutional rules governing elections.

Kenya’s election clock

The High Court ruling has not automatically cancelled the 2027 election timetable.

The IEBC continues to identify Aug. 10, 2027 as the date for the next general election in its published plan.

But the legal challenge means that date is now part of a much wider constitutional debate.

The final outcome could determine how Kenya interprets presidential tenure and its five year electoral cycle.

It could also shape the political environment surrounding Ruto’s second term ambitions.

For Kenya, the stakes are bigger than the date on the ballot paper.

The case tests the relationship between the judiciary, the presidency and the electoral commission.

It also tests the strength of Kenya’s constitutional system at a time when political alliances are already shifting.

The road to the Kenya 2027 election may therefore be decided not only on the campaign trail, but also in the courtroom.

Africa’s health systems face a governance crisis as funding fails to deliver

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Africa’s health systems face a governance crisis as funding fails to deliver

Weak institutions, inefficient spending and a growing healthcare workforce exodus are leaving African health systems vulnerable despite billions of dollars in domestic and international support.

Africa’s healthcare crisis is increasingly exposing a problem that money alone cannot solve: weak governance.

Across the continent, recurring disease outbreaks, shortages of medicines and equipment, overstretched hospitals and protests by healthcare workers are revealing persistent weaknesses in the way health systems are funded, managed and held accountable.

From Ebola outbreaks in Central and East Africa to industrial action by doctors and nurses in Kenya, Nigeria and Zimbabwe, the pressures are widespread.

The challenge is becoming more urgent as African populations grow and governments face competing demands for scarce public resources.

For countries that have received billions of dollars in international health assistance over decades, the question is no longer simply whether more money is needed.

It is whether existing resources are being converted into functioning hospitals, adequately staffed facilities and reliable healthcare for ordinary citizens.

Funding is only part of the problem

Africa’s health systems remain chronically underfunded.

Many countries have failed to meet the Abuja Declaration target of allocating at least 15% of national budgets to healthcare.

But funding shortfalls do not fully explain why hospitals can lack essential medicines and equipment even when budgets have been approved.

Audits and independent reviews cited in the source material point to recurring problems including delayed disbursement of funds, procurement irregularities and underutilisation of allocated budgets.

The consequences are often visible at the frontline.

Healthcare workers report outdated equipment, shortages of basic medicines and infrastructure projects delayed by administrative bottlenecks.

That points to a broader problem: the effectiveness of health spending depends not only on how much governments allocate, but on how those resources are managed.

A cycle of crisis and response

Disease outbreaks repeatedly expose these weaknesses.

Emergency responses can mobilise international expertise, funding and logistics, but the improvements often prove difficult to sustain once the immediate threat has passed.

The World Health Organization and the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention remain important in coordinating responses to health emergencies.

Yet rural clinics can return to chronic shortages, laboratories can remain under-equipped and disease surveillance systems can continue to operate below the capacity needed to detect threats early.

This creates a recurring pattern: emergency intervention followed by a return to structural vulnerability.

For patients, the consequences extend well beyond outbreaks.

In many rural and underserved areas, people must travel long distances to reach healthcare facilities that may themselves lack medicines, equipment or sufficient staff.

A system that is constantly responding to emergencies has less capacity to prevent them.

International aid fills gaps but creates dependencies

International organisations have played a major role in improving healthcare across Africa.

The World Bank, Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, and Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, have supported programmes addressing HIV, tuberculosis, malaria and vaccine-preventable diseases.

Those programmes have delivered important gains.

But reliance on external financing can create another vulnerability.

When governments depend heavily on donors to fill domestic funding gaps, long-term health planning can become tied to external priorities. In some cases, donor-funded programmes focus heavily on individual diseases rather than the wider infrastructure required to sustain healthcare delivery.

The result can be a system that performs well in selected areas while remaining vulnerable elsewhere.

A successful vaccination campaign, for example, cannot compensate for a shortage of doctors, laboratories or functioning primary healthcare facilities.

Healthcare workers are becoming a pressure point

Few indicators reveal the strain on public health systems more clearly than the growing dissatisfaction among healthcare workers.

Doctors and nurses in Kenya have staged repeated strikes over pay, working conditions and delayed salaries. Similar disputes have occurred in Nigeria, while Zimbabwe’s health sector has faced prolonged industrial action.

The disputes are often presented as labour conflicts.

But the underlying grievances point to wider systemic weaknesses.

Healthcare workers report chronic understaffing, inadequate equipment and difficult working conditions. Years of responding to the COVID-19 pandemic and other health emergencies have also increased pressure on frontline staff.

Burnout and declining morale can further weaken already stretched services.

Then there is migration.

Skilled doctors and nurses are increasingly seeking better-paid opportunities in Europe, North America and the Middle East.

The loss of trained professionals creates a difficult cycle. Fewer workers mean greater pressure on those who remain, which can make working conditions worse and encourage more professionals to leave.

COVID-19 exposed the preparedness gap

The COVID-19 pandemic provided one of the clearest tests of Africa’s health infrastructure in decades.

Many governments introduced public health measures quickly, but the pandemic exposed shortages in critical care capacity, oxygen supplies, personal protective equipment and other essential resources.

Intensive care units remain limited in many countries, particularly outside major urban centres.

Since the pandemic, governments and regional institutions have promoted stronger surveillance systems, expanded laboratory capacity and improved emergency response planning.

The weakness is implementation.

Preparedness plans require sustained funding, trained personnel and functioning institutions. Without those foundations, strategies can remain largely theoretical.

The next health emergency will test whether the lessons of COVID-19 have translated into permanent improvements.

Political choices shape health outcomes

At the centre of the crisis is a political question: what do governments choose to prioritise?

African governments face pressure to finance infrastructure, security, debt obligations and other national priorities.

But persistent underinvestment in healthcare can carry significant economic costs of its own.

Weak governance can compound the problem.

Limited transparency and ineffective institutions can undermine public spending, while opaque procurement systems can contribute to inflated costs and delays in delivering medical supplies.

When citizens lose confidence in public healthcare, those who can afford it may turn to private providers.

Those who cannot are left with fewer alternatives.

That creates a two-tier system in which access to quality care increasingly depends on income and location.

Africa’s progress is uneven

The continent’s health crisis should not be treated as uniform.

Some countries have made substantial progress in expanding healthcare access.

Rwanda has invested in community-based healthcare and insurance coverage. Ghana’s National Health Insurance Scheme has expanded access to services, while South Africa has relatively advanced healthcare infrastructure despite persistent challenges.

But progress varies sharply between countries and within them.

Rural communities and conflict-affected areas often face the greatest shortages of healthcare workers, equipment and financing.

The differences suggest that solutions must be tailored to national and local circumstances rather than imposed through a single continental model.

Following the money

Where health money goes matters as much as how much is available.

A substantial share of health financing is directed towards disease-specific programmes, particularly HIV, malaria and tuberculosis.

Those programmes have produced measurable results, but broader needs such as primary healthcare, workforce development and maintenance of existing facilities can receive less attention.

Hospital construction illustrates the problem.

New facilities are highly visible and can become attractive political projects. But buildings alone do not provide healthcare.

Hospitals require doctors, nurses, medicines, equipment, electricity, maintenance and long-term operating budgets.

Without those resources, expensive facilities can remain underused.

Administrative delays create another drain on public resources, with funds sometimes becoming trapped in complex bureaucratic systems before reaching frontline services.

Greater transparency over health budgets and procurement is therefore central to improving outcomes.

The cost is ultimately paid by patients

The consequences of these failures are measured not only in budgets and strikes, but in human lives.

Patients face long waiting times, shortages of essential medicines and high out-of-pocket costs.

For low-income households, medical expenses can push families into financial hardship.

Delays in diagnosis and treatment can also turn preventable illnesses into life-threatening conditions.

Healthcare workers face their own risks, working long hours in stressful environments and, during outbreaks, sometimes without adequate protection.

The cumulative effect is a system that struggles to provide reliable care when people need it most.

A chance to rebuild

The decline is not irreversible.

The African Union and Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention are pursuing initiatives aimed at improving regional coordination and strengthening local capacity.

African countries are also exploring domestic production of vaccines, medicines and medical supplies, while digital health technologies could help expand access and improve efficiency.

But none of these measures will succeed without sustained political commitment.

Building resilient health systems requires governments to look beyond emergency responses and invest consistently in primary care, healthcare workers, laboratories, supply chains and public health infrastructure.

It also requires stronger oversight of how health budgets are allocated and spent.

Conclusion

Africa’s healthcare crisis is often described as a shortage of money.

The evidence presented in this analysis suggests a more complicated picture.

Funding matters, but governance determines how effectively that funding reaches patients.

Weak institutions, procurement problems, workforce shortages, dependence on external financing and inconsistent political commitment can undermine even well-funded programmes.

The choice facing African governments is therefore broader than whether to increase health budgets.

They must decide whether healthcare will be treated as a long-term investment in economic and social stability, rather than a sector that receives urgent attention only when the next crisis arrives.

For millions of Africans, that distinction could determine whether the continent remains trapped in a cycle of emergency response or builds health systems capable of preventing, absorbing and recovering from future shocks.

Africa’s migration crossroads: The truth behind South Africa’s migrant crisis

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Africa’s migration crossroads: The truth behind South Africa’s migrant crisis

South Africa’s intensifying crackdown on migrants is driving deportations, increasing fear among foreign nationals and raising concerns across Southern Africa about the political, economic and humanitarian consequences.

More than 178,000 migrants have recently left or been deported, according to official figures and regional estimates. Rights groups describe the campaign as one of the most aggressive enforcement periods in years.

The crackdown comes as South Africa faces high unemployment, economic stagnation and growing anti-immigrant sentiment. Political pressure is also increasing ahead of key electoral cycles.

The impact extends beyond South Africa. Neighbouring countries in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) are dealing with returning migrants, strained public services and growing diplomatic concerns.

At the centre of the debate is a broader question: Who benefits from South Africa’s migrant crackdown?

Migration Becomes a Political Issue

Migration has become a major issue in South African politics. Political parties across the spectrum are increasingly calling for tougher action against undocumented migrants.

Analysts say the shift reflects public frustration over unemployment, inequality and crime.

South Africa’s unemployment rate remains above 30%, among the highest in the world. Migrants are often portrayed as competing with South Africans for jobs and public services, despite limited evidence supporting that claim.

“Migration has become a convenient political pressure valve,” said a Johannesburg-based policy researcher. “It allows leaders to redirect public anger without addressing deeper structural problems.”

Political rhetoric has also linked migrants to crime and economic decline. Such claims resonate with communities facing rising living costs and limited employment opportunities.

The narrative has contributed to periodic outbreaks of xenophobic violence, with foreign-owned businesses among the frequent targets.

Government officials say the enforcement campaign is focused on upholding immigration laws. Critics, however, argue that the scale and intensity of the operations point to a wider political dimension.

The Economic Debate

The economic impact of migration remains contested.

Government officials and political leaders often argue that migrants place additional pressure on public services. But economists say the reality is more complicated.

Many migrants work in informal sectors such as construction, agriculture and small-scale retail. These are areas where labour shortages can exist.

Other migrants run businesses that contribute to local economies and create jobs.

Economists argue that migrants can fill gaps in the labour market rather than simply replace South African workers. Some work in sectors where local workers may be less willing to take available jobs.

“The idea that migrants are the primary cause of unemployment is not supported by data,” said an economist based in Cape Town. “The real issues are slow economic growth, skills mismatches and structural inequality.”

Public services remain under pressure in some urban areas. Healthcare facilities and schools are dealing with increased demand, which officials partly attribute to migration.

That pressure has fuelled resentment in communities where resources are already limited.

Inside the Deportation System

South Africa has expanded its deportation operations in recent years. Authorities have increased border enforcement, workplace inspections and detention operations.

Migrants without proper documentation can be detained in holding centres before being processed for deportation.

Rights groups have raised concerns about conditions in some facilities. They cite overcrowding, limited access to legal representation and delays in processing cases.

The government says the operations are lawful and necessary to protect national security and maintain order.

Advocacy organisations argue that enforcement measures can disproportionately affect vulnerable migrants.

“There is a growing system that operates with limited transparency,” said a regional human rights observer. “The scale of deportations suggests a coordinated effort that goes beyond routine enforcement.”

Reports have also highlighted the role of informal networks, including local vigilante groups. In some cases, these groups assist or pressure authorities during raids.

This has made it harder to distinguish between official enforcement and community-driven action.

Humanitarian Cost

The crackdown is also having a human cost.

Families are being separated, children are missing school and some migrant communities are struggling to access healthcare.

In Johannesburg and Durban, some migrants say they are avoiding public spaces and government services because they fear arrest.

This has contributed to lower attendance at schools and reduced use of routine healthcare services. Humanitarian groups warn that the long-term effects could be serious if the crackdown continues at its current pace.

“Migration is not just a legal issue, it is a human issue,” said a representative from a regional aid group. “When people are pushed out abruptly, it creates ripple effects that extend far beyond borders.”

Women and children are particularly vulnerable to exploitation and may have limited access to support services.

Pressure on Neighbouring Countries

Africa’s migration crossroads The truth behind South Africa’s migrant crisis
At the Beitbridge border crossing, long queues of travelers and heavy trucks underscore the vital role of South Africa’s gateway to Zimbabwe and the wider Southern African region.

South Africa’s migration policies are also affecting neighbouring countries.

Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Malawi are receiving returning migrants, many of whom had left their home countries because of economic hardship.

The return of large numbers of people is putting additional pressure on already fragile economies. Governments face the challenge of providing services while creating jobs for returnees.

Diplomatic tensions have also emerged. Some governments have expressed concern about how their citizens are being treated in South Africa.

Calls for greater regional cooperation and coordinated migration policies are growing.

SADC has emphasised the importance of cooperation, but progress has been slow. Different national interests and economic conditions have made it difficult to develop a unified regional approach.

Migration across Southern Africa has historically been driven by economic differences. South Africa has remained a major destination because of its relatively stronger economy.

The current crackdown could change these migration patterns for years to come.

Migration and Crime

Crime remains one of the most sensitive issues in South Africa’s migration debate.

Some political leaders and community groups argue that undocumented migrants contribute to crime. These claims have helped build public support for tougher enforcement.

Research findings, however, are mixed. While some localised problems exist, there is no clear evidence that migration is responsible for overall increases in crime rates.

Experts warn that linking migration too closely with crime can reinforce harmful stereotypes and distract from other causes of insecurity.

“Crime in South Africa is a complex issue with many drivers,” said a security analyst. “Focusing solely on migrants oversimplifies the problem and risks ignoring more effective solutions.”

Despite this, high-profile incidents and political messaging continue to shape public opinion.

Informal Power Networks

The migration debate is not shaped by government policy alone.

Community groups, local business associations and criminal organisations can also influence how enforcement takes place.

In some areas, organised groups have taken it upon themselves to identify and report undocumented migrants. Such actions can sometimes escalate into violence.

There are also allegations that some networks profit from the migration system by facilitating illegal crossings or exploiting detained migrants.

These claims point to hidden economies surrounding migration and highlight concerns about transparency and accountability.

Analysts say stronger oversight of enforcement systems is needed to address these risks.

A Region at a Crossroads

South Africa’s migration crisis reflects wider challenges across Southern Africa, including economic inequality, weak institutions and population movement.

As deportations increase and tensions rise, pressure is growing for governments to find longer-term solutions.

Experts say enforcement needs to be balanced with humanitarian concerns and regional cooperation.

Possible solutions include creating more legal migration pathways, investing in economic development across the region and strengthening institutions responsible for managing migration.

“There is no simple solution,” said a regional policy expert. “But ignoring the root causes will only deepen the crisis.”

What Happens Next?

Migration is likely to remain a major issue in South Africa’s political and economic debate.

With public pressure mounting, policymakers face difficult choices over how to enforce immigration laws while managing the economic and humanitarian consequences.

The current trajectory points to continued enforcement and tougher political rhetoric. But the long-term sustainability of that approach remains uncertain.

For migrants, the immediate reality is one of uncertainty and risk.

For neighbouring countries, the consequences could be even broader as returning migrants place additional pressure on economies and public services.

The central question is whether regional cooperation and policy reform can prevail over division and short-term political gains.

The answer could shape not only the future of migration in Southern Africa but also the region’s wider prospects for stability and economic development.

Africa’s $1 billion football mistake: How CAF lost a historic AFCON deal

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Africa’s $1 billion football mistake: How CAF lost a historic AFCON deal

Africa’s football governing body, the Confederation of African Football (CAF), is facing renewed scrutiny after a decision to change the frequency of the Africa Cup of Nations (AFCON) disrupted a potential commercial deal worth more than $1 billion.

The deal was reportedly being negotiated as an eight-year package covering broadcasting and commercial rights.

But CAF’s decision to move AFCON from a two-year cycle to a four-year cycle after the 2028 tournament changed the value of the proposed package.

The setback has raised fresh questions about CAF’s commercial strategy, governance and ability to maximise the value of Africa’s biggest football tournament.

A $1 billion opportunity disrupted

The issue goes beyond when AFCON is played. It is also about how often the tournament takes place.

For decades, AFCON has been held every two years. That regular schedule has helped broadcasters and sponsors plan their investments around one of Africa’s biggest sporting events.

CAF’s decision to move to a four-year cycle from 2028 was aimed partly at reducing clashes with the international football calendar and European club competitions.

But the move also means fewer AFCON tournaments will be available to commercial partners during an eight-year rights period.

That change reportedly disrupted a deal that had been close to completion and was valued at more than $1 billion.

CAF President Patrice Motsepe had previously said the organisation was close to securing an eight-year broadcast agreement worth $1 billion covering major CAF competitions.

The change to the AFCON cycle altered the commercial proposition and forced CAF to reconsider how future rights would be packaged.

Why AFCON scheduling matters

AFCON scheduling has always been difficult.

Many of Africa’s best players play for European clubs. When the tournament is held during the European football season, those clubs must release their players for international duty.

That can leave clubs without key players during important domestic and European matches.

CAF has tried to reduce the problem by moving AFCON towards the European off-season.

But that solution has its own challenges.

Weather conditions vary sharply across Africa. Heavy rains can disrupt matches and transport in some regions, while extreme heat can create problems in others.

The international football calendar also leaves limited room for major tournaments.

The 2025 AFCON showed how complicated the situation can become.

The tournament was eventually held from December 2025 to January 2026 after its original mid-year window clashed with the expanded FIFA Club World Cup.

The battle with European clubs

The scheduling problem is closely linked to the growing influence of European club football.

A large share of Africa’s leading players are based in Europe, where clubs invest heavily in their squads and depend on their best players throughout the season.

When AFCON is held during the European season, clubs can lose important players for several weeks.

The issue has created tensions between national teams and clubs.

CAF’s four-year AFCON cycle is partly intended to create a more manageable international calendar.

But reducing the frequency of AFCON also creates a commercial problem because the tournament is one of CAF’s most valuable revenue-generating assets.

Why the money matters

AFCON is not just a football tournament. It is a major source of income for African football.

Reuters reported in December 2025 that AFCON accounts for about 80% of CAF’s revenue.

That makes the tournament central to CAF’s financial model.

Broadcasting rights, sponsorships and commercial partnerships generate money that supports CAF and its member associations.

A reduction in the number of AFCON tournaments could therefore have consequences across African football.

National associations, particularly smaller ones, often depend on continental funding to support competitions, youth programmes and development projects.

Infrastructure remains a challenge

The calendar is only part of the problem.

Hosting AFCON requires modern stadiums, training grounds, reliable transport, hotels, security and communications infrastructure.

Not every potential host country has all of these facilities in place.

Climate can also complicate preparations.

Africa’s regions have very different weather patterns, making it difficult to identify a single tournament window that works equally well everywhere.

Morocco’s hosting of AFCON 2025 showed what is possible when a host has strong infrastructure.

The tournament was staged across six cities and nine stadiums, with 52 matches played over 29 days.

The challenge for CAF is to ensure that future hosts can meet similar standards.

Questions over CAF’s strategy

The commercial setback has also put CAF’s decision-making under the spotlight.

Motsepe, who became CAF president in 2021, has pushed for reforms aimed at improving the organisation’s finances and commercial performance.

But the AFCON change shows how difficult it can be to balance sporting priorities with commercial interests.

For broadcasters and sponsors, predictability is critical.

Companies negotiating multi-year rights agreements need to know when tournaments will take place, how often they will be held and what competitions are included.

Major changes can force them to reassess the value of their investments.

Who could lose?

The consequences could extend beyond CAF.

National football associations could receive less money if commercial revenues decline. Smaller associations could be particularly vulnerable because they have fewer alternative sources of income.

Broadcasters and sponsors could also become more cautious about investing in African football.

Players and fans could feel the effects indirectly if reduced revenues lead to less money for development, facilities and tournament operations.

CAF, however, says the new competition structure can create a more sustainable football calendar.

The organisation plans to introduce an African Nations League from 2029, which it says will help compensate for the reduced frequency of AFCON.

Africa’s bigger football problem

The AFCON dispute exposes a much larger challenge.

Africa produces some of the world’s best footballers, yet much of the financial value generated by that talent is captured outside the continent.

European clubs benefit from African players, while many African leagues struggle to attract major broadcasting and sponsorship deals.

AFCON is different.

It has a global audience and a strong identity. That gives CAF an opportunity to build one of the world’s most valuable international football properties.

But doing so requires more than talented players.

It requires a stable calendar, reliable infrastructure, strong governance and a commercial strategy that can withstand changes in the football market.

What CAF needs to do

CAF’s immediate challenge is to restore confidence among broadcasters, sponsors and investors.

The organisation needs to provide a clear long-term competition calendar and avoid major changes that could undermine commercial agreements.

It also needs to develop new revenue streams to compensate for holding AFCON less frequently.

The planned African Nations League could play a role, but its commercial success will depend on whether CAF can make the competition attractive to broadcasters, sponsors, players and fans.

Infrastructure investment will also remain important.

Public-private partnerships could help host countries improve stadiums, transport and other facilities needed for major tournaments.

The lesson for African football

The $1 billion setback offers a simple lesson: sporting decisions and commercial decisions cannot be separated.

Changing the frequency of AFCON may help solve some problems with the international calendar, but it also changes the value of the tournament to broadcasters and sponsors.

CAF must therefore find a balance between the needs of players and clubs, the realities of hosting tournaments and the commercial demands of the global football industry.

A turning point

The reported loss of a potential $1 billion commercial opportunity is a major setback for CAF.

But it could also become a turning point.

Moving AFCON to a four-year cycle gives CAF an opportunity to rethink how African football is packaged and sold globally.

The organisation now needs to prove that fewer AFCON tournaments can be offset by stronger commercial partnerships and new competitions.

For African football, the challenge is no longer simply producing world-class players.

It is building a football business capable of capturing more of the value that those players and competitions generate.

The $1 billion opportunity may have been lost, but the bigger question is whether CAF can ensure the next one is not.

Who owns Africa’s biggest telecom companies? The real owners

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Who owns Africa’s biggest telecom companies? The real owners

Africa’s biggest telecom companies connect more than a billion people, move vast sums through mobile-money platforms and control infrastructure that is becoming essential to the continent’s economy. But behind the familiar brands are ownership structures that stretch across Africa, Europe, Asia and the Middle East. So, who really owns Africa’s telecom giants?

For millions of Africans, telecom ownership appears simple. A customer buys an MTN, Airtel, Safaricom, Orange or Vodacom SIM card and sees a familiar brand. The company appears local because its shops, towers, employees and customers are local.

The ownership story is often very different.

Some of Africa’s largest telecom companies are controlled by foreign multinationals. Others have governments as major shareholders. Some are publicly traded and owned indirectly by pension funds and institutional investors. A smaller group is controlled by African billionaires and private investment groups.

This makes telecom ownership in Africa one of the continent’s most important and least understood business stories.

The stakes are also rising.

Mobile networks are no longer just about voice calls and text messages. Telecom companies now operate mobile-money platforms, fibre networks, data centres and digital-payment systems. They increasingly sit at the centre of Africa’s digital economy.

The company controlling a mobile network can therefore have influence over much more than telecommunications.

It can control a major financial platform, access to digital services and relationships with millions of consumers.

Africa’s biggest telecom companies

The scale of Africa’s telecom industry is enormous.

MTN Group remains the continent’s largest telecom operator by subscriber numbers. The South African-based group ended 2025 with more than 307 million customers across 16 markets.

Airtel Africa followed with 183.5 million customers at the end of March 2026. Orange had about 179 million customers across Africa and the Middle East.

Vodacom has also expanded its influence after increasing its effective stake in Safaricom, Kenya’s largest telecom operator and the company behind M-Pesa.

Other major players include Maroc Telecom, Ethio Telecom, AXIAN Telecom’s Yas, Telkom South Africa and Nigeria’s Globacom.

Yet subscriber numbers tell only part of the story.

To understand the real power of these companies, it is necessary to look behind the brands.

MTN Group: Who owns Africa’s largest telecom operator?

MTN Group is Africa’s largest telecom company by customer base.

Headquartered in South Africa, the company operates across 16 African markets.

Nigeria is one of its largest operations, while South Africa remains its corporate and financial centre.

MTN is listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. That means it is not controlled by a single billionaire or directly owned by the South African government.

Instead, its shares are held by institutional investors, pension funds, strategic shareholders and members of the public.

One of the most important shareholders is the Public Investment Corporation, or PIC.

The PIC manages money on behalf of South African public-sector funds, including the Government Employees Pension Fund.

This gives South African public capital a significant financial interest in MTN.

However, that does not make MTN a traditional state-owned company.

The distinction matters.

A government-linked investment institution can own shares in a listed company without controlling its day-to-day management.

MTN is becoming more than a telecom company

MTN’s transformation also explains why its ownership matters.

The group has invested heavily in mobile money, data and digital services.

Its MoMo platform had around 70 million customers at the end of 2025.

MTN also reported more than $500 billion in MoMo transaction value during the year.

That makes the company a major player in African financial technology.

In other words, owning part of MTN increasingly means owning part of Africa’s digital-finance infrastructure.

Airtel Africa: The Indian telecom empire in Africa

Airtel Africa is Africa’s second-largest telecom operator by subscriber numbers.

The company had 183.5 million customers at the end of March 2026.

It operates in 14 African countries, including Nigeria, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Zambia, Malawi and Rwanda.

It also has a large presence in Francophone Africa.

But Airtel Africa’s ownership is not primarily African.

The company is controlled by India’s Bharti Airtel, the telecom group associated with billionaire Sunil Bharti Mittal.

Airtel Africa is listed in London and Nigeria.

However, the existence of those listings does not mean that control is shared equally among African investors.

Bharti controls the company through a chain of holding companies.

This makes Airtel Africa one of the clearest examples of foreign ownership of African telecom companies.

Why Airtel Africa’s ownership matters

Airtel Africa demonstrates how the nationality of a brand can differ from the nationality of its controlling capital.

Its customers are African.

Its network infrastructure is largely African.

Most of its business activity takes place in Africa.

Yet ultimate corporate control sits with an Indian multinational group.

The structure is not unusual in the telecom industry.

Building large mobile networks requires enormous amounts of capital. International telecom groups have therefore played a major role in developing Africa’s digital infrastructure.

The question for African governments is how to attract that capital while retaining appropriate strategic oversight.

Orange: French ownership with a powerful African footprint

Orange is one of Europe’s largest telecom companies and one of Africa’s biggest foreign telecom investors.

The French company had nearly 180 million customers in Africa and the Middle East at the end of 2025.

Its African footprint includes markets such as Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal, Cameroon, Morocco, Egypt, Mali, Burkina Faso and Madagascar.

Orange has increasingly made Africa a central part of its growth strategy.

Its mobile-money business is also expanding rapidly.

Orange Money has become one of Africa’s major mobile financial platforms, serving tens of millions of customers.

Who owns Orange?

Orange is publicly listed, but the French state remains a major shareholder.

The French government holds a direct interest in Orange and has additional exposure through Bpifrance.

This makes Orange an interesting hybrid.

It is a publicly traded multinational company, but the French state retains a significant economic interest.

That ownership matters because telecom networks are increasingly treated as strategic infrastructure.

They carry government communications, financial transactions, business data and information used by millions of citizens.

For France, maintaining a significant interest in Orange therefore has both economic and strategic importance.

For Africa, Orange represents the continued influence of European capital in the continent’s telecommunications sector.

Vodacom: The Vodafone connection

Vodacom Group is headquartered in South Africa but is controlled by Britain’s Vodafone Group.

Vodafone owns 65.1% of Vodacom.

The company operates in several African markets, including South Africa, Tanzania, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Mozambique and Lesotho.

But Vodacom’s position in Africa became even more important after its increased investment in Safaricom.

The transaction changed the ownership structure of one of Africa’s most valuable telecom companies.

Safaricom: Kenya’s national champion changes hands

Safaricom is arguably the most strategically important telecom company in East Africa.

The company dominates Kenya’s mobile market and operates M-Pesa, one of the world’s most successful mobile-money platforms.

For years, Safaricom’s ownership was divided between Vodafone, the Kenyan government and public investors.

That structure changed in 2026.

Vodacom increased its effective ownership of Safaricom to approximately 55%.

The Kenyan government retained a 20% stake.

The remaining shares are publicly held.

This means Safaricom remains a Kenyan-listed company and a Kenyan national brand, but effective corporate control now sits with Vodacom.

Vodacom, in turn, is controlled by Vodafone.

Why Safaricom is different

Safaricom is not simply a telecom company.

M-Pesa has become deeply integrated into Kenya’s economy.

Consumers use the platform to send money, pay bills, purchase goods and services and access financial products.

Businesses also depend on the platform for payments.

This gives Safaricom an influence that goes far beyond traditional telecommunications.

Vodacom’s increased ownership therefore gives Vodafone greater exposure to one of Africa’s most developed mobile-money markets.

It also demonstrates how foreign ownership can increase even when a company retains its national identity.

Maroc Telecom: UAE capital controls a Moroccan giant

Maroc Telecom is another major example of cross-border ownership.

The Moroccan company had nearly 77 million customers at the end of 2025.

It operates across 11 African countries.

Outside Morocco, many of its operations use the Moov Africa brand.

The ownership structure is relatively clear.

UAE-based Etisalat owns 53% of Maroc Telecom.

The Moroccan government owns 22%.

The remaining 25% is publicly traded.

That gives a Gulf telecom company majority control while the Moroccan state retains a substantial minority stake.

Maroc Telecom’s African expansion

Maroc Telecom operates in markets including Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Togo.

Its footprint demonstrates the increasing movement of capital between North Africa, the Gulf and sub-Saharan Africa.

Morocco has also positioned itself as an important gateway between Europe and Africa.

Maroc Telecom is part of that wider economic relationship.

The company therefore represents more than a Moroccan telecom story.

It is also an example of how Gulf capital is becoming increasingly important in Africa’s digital infrastructure.

Ethio Telecom: Africa’s major state-controlled operator

Ethio Telecom represents a very different ownership model.

For decades, the company operated as a state monopoly.

Ethiopia later opened its telecom market to private competition.

Safaricom Ethiopia entered the market in 2022.

Despite that competition, Ethio Telecom remains the dominant operator.

The company reported more than 90 million customers during the 2025/26 financial year.

That gives it one of the largest customer bases of any telecom operator in Africa.

Ethiopia begins to open ownership

The Ethiopian government has also started introducing private ownership.

A share sale attracted Ethiopian citizens, with 10.7 million shares sold.

The move was significant because it marked a departure from complete state ownership.

However, the government remains firmly in control.

Ethio Telecom therefore demonstrates that market liberalisation does not automatically mean foreign ownership.

A government can allow competition while retaining control of its largest telecom company.

Yas and AXIAN: The rise of African private capital

The rise of AXIAN Telecom provides an important counterpoint to the dominance of foreign multinationals.

AXIAN operates its telecom businesses under the Yas brand.

The group has operations in markets including Tanzania, Madagascar, Senegal, Togo and Comoros.

Its telecom expansion has been driven largely by acquisitions and investment.

The company is associated with Malagasy businessman Hassanein Hiridjee.

This makes AXIAN one of Africa’s most important examples of private African capital building a regional telecom empire.

Yas is more than a mobile network

Yas is also expanding into digital financial services.

Its Mixx by Yas platform provides mobile financial services in several markets.

This reflects a wider trend across African telecoms.

The most valuable companies are increasingly those that can connect telecommunications with finance.

Mobile data brings customers onto the network.

Mobile money keeps them inside the ecosystem.

Financial services can then create additional revenue.

That model is reshaping the competition between Africa’s telecom giants.

Telkom South Africa: A state-linked telecom company

Telkom South Africa occupies a different position.

The South African government holds about 40.5% of the company.

The Public Investment Corporation is also a significant shareholder.

Telkom operates mobile, fixed-line, fibre and information-technology businesses.

Its ownership structure gives the government substantial influence while allowing the company to operate commercially as a listed business.

This hybrid model is common in strategic industries.

Governments want private capital and commercial efficiency.

At the same time, they want to retain influence over infrastructure considered important to national development and security.

Telkom illustrates that balance.

Globacom: The Nigerian billionaire behind Glo

Nigeria’s Globacom offers another ownership model.

The company was founded by Nigerian billionaire Mike Adenuga in 2003.

Unlike MTN Nigeria and Airtel Nigeria, Globacom is not controlled by a foreign publicly traded telecom group.

It remains privately controlled through Adenuga’s business interests.

Globacom has reduced its international footprint in recent years.

After leaving Ghana and Benin, the company is now focused on Nigeria.

However, Nigeria is Africa’s largest single telecom market.

That gives Globacom a significant domestic customer base and strategic importance.

Its ownership also demonstrates the role of African billionaires in building major infrastructure businesses.

The continent’s telecom sector is therefore not simply a story about foreign investors.

African private capital also controls major networks.

Who really owns Africa’s telecom companies?

The answer becomes clearer when the major operators are placed into broad ownership categories.

Publicly listed African companies

MTN and Telkom demonstrate how African telecom companies can remain locally listed while being owned by a mixture of institutional investors, pension funds and public shareholders.

Foreign-controlled telecom groups

Airtel Africa and Vodacom demonstrate how African telecom assets can be controlled by multinational companies headquartered outside the continent.

State-linked companies

Orange, Maroc Telecom and Safaricom all have significant government interests, although the governments involved do not necessarily hold majority control.

State-owned operators

Ethio Telecom remains overwhelmingly controlled by the Ethiopian government.

African private ownership

Globacom and AXIAN demonstrate the growing ability of African entrepreneurs and investment groups to build telecom businesses with regional reach.

These categories are not always mutually exclusive.

A company can have foreign majority ownership, a local government as a major shareholder and thousands of individual investors.

That is why the phrase African-owned telecom company can sometimes be misleading.

The hidden role of pension funds

One of the least visible forces behind Africa’s telecom companies is institutional investment.

Pension funds can own significant stakes in publicly listed businesses.

South Africa’s Public Investment Corporation is one of the continent’s most important examples.

It manages public-sector retirement assets and invests across the economy.

This means ordinary workers can have an indirect financial interest in telecom companies through their pension savings.

They may never buy an MTN or Telkom share directly.

But their retirement fund may own shares in those companies.

In this sense, some of Africa’s largest telecom businesses are partly owned by millions of pension contributors.

That is an important part of the ownership story.

Why telecom ownership matters

Ownership becomes more important as telecom companies expand into new industries.

Mobile networks now support financial transactions, e-commerce, entertainment, cloud services and digital communications.

Mobile-money platforms are particularly important.

MTN operates MoMo.

Airtel operates Airtel Money.

Orange operates Orange Money.

Safaricom operates M-Pesa.

Yas operates Mixx by Yas.

These platforms turn telecom operators into major financial-services companies.

That creates new questions about data, competition, regulation and ownership.

Who controls the data generated by millions of transactions?

Who controls the infrastructure?

Who receives the profits?

Who has influence over the company’s strategic decisions?

The answers can be found in the ownership structures behind the brands.

Foreign investment and African control

Foreign investment has been critical to Africa’s telecom development.

Companies from Europe, India and the Gulf have invested billions of dollars in networks, spectrum, fibre and digital services.

That capital has helped expand connectivity.

It has also introduced technology, management expertise and access to international financing.

But the growing importance of telecoms creates a difficult question for governments.

How much strategic control should remain in African hands?

There is no single answer.

Kenya retains 20% of Safaricom.

Morocco owns 22% of Maroc Telecom.

South Africa has a substantial stake in Telkom.

Ethiopia controls Ethio Telecom.

France remains a major shareholder in Orange.

These structures show that governments continue to view telecommunications as a strategic sector.

Africa’s telecom ownership is becoming more global

The old image of Africa’s telecom industry being dominated by European companies is changing.

European groups remain powerful.

Vodafone controls Vodacom.

Orange has a major African business.

But Indian capital has become equally important through Bharti Airtel.

Gulf capital has strengthened its position through Etisalat’s ownership of Maroc Telecom.

African governments remain significant shareholders.

African pension funds invest in listed telecom companies.

And private African entrepreneurs are building regional groups.

The result is a much more complicated ownership map.

Capital is moving in several directions at once.

African companies are buying African assets.

Gulf investors are entering digital infrastructure.

Asian telecom groups are expanding their African operations.

European companies are defending established positions.

Governments are selling stakes to raise money while retaining strategic interests.

The next telecom battle will be about infrastructure

Subscriber numbers will remain important.

But the next major battle in Africa’s telecom industry could be about infrastructure.

That includes:

  • Fibre-optic networks
  • 4G and 5G networks
  • Data centres
  • Submarine cables
  • Cloud infrastructure
  • Digital-payment systems
  • Mobile-money platforms
  • Artificial intelligence infrastructure

The companies that control these assets will have increasing influence over Africa’s digital economy.

This could trigger more mergers, acquisitions and strategic partnerships.

It could also attract new investors.

Gulf sovereign funds, international private-equity firms, pension funds, technology companies and African investment groups are all potential sources of capital.

As governments face financial pressure, some may also consider selling additional stakes in strategic telecom companies.

The real question is not who owns the logo

Africa’s telecom landscape tells a larger story about ownership and power.

MTN is a South African-listed giant with major institutional shareholders.

Airtel Africa is controlled by India’s Bharti group.

Orange has French state backing.

Vodacom is controlled by Vodafone.

Safaricom is majority-controlled by Vodacom, while Kenya retains a significant minority stake.

Maroc Telecom is controlled by UAE-based Etisalat, with the Moroccan government retaining 22%.

Ethio Telecom remains overwhelmingly state-controlled.

AXIAN represents privately controlled African capital expanding across several markets.

Globacom remains a Nigerian private telecom empire associated with Mike Adenuga.

The common thread is that Africa’s telecom ownership is global, complex and increasingly strategic.

The brands may feel local.

The customers are local.

The towers stand on African soil.

But the capital behind those towers can come from Johannesburg, London, Mumbai, Paris, Abu Dhabi or private African fortunes.

That is why understanding who owns Africa’s telecom companies matters.

As telecom networks become the foundation of banking, commerce, information and digital services, ownership will increasingly determine who has economic power in Africa’s digital future.

The next question may therefore not be who has the most subscribers.

It may be who controls the infrastructure connecting those subscribers, the money moving through their phones and the data generated by their digital lives.

For African governments, that raises a strategic choice: attract the capital needed to build world-class digital infrastructure while ensuring that national interests remain protected.

For investors, the opportunity is equally significant.

Africa’s telecom companies are evolving into digital platforms with enormous customer bases and growing financial ecosystems.

And for consumers, the question is perhaps the simplest of all:

When you make a call, send money or buy data, who ultimately owns the network making that transaction possible?

That answer lies not on the SIM card.

It lies several corporate layers behind it.

What the diaspora gets wrong about African investment risk

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What the diaspora gets wrong about African investment risk

For Africans living abroad, investing in Africa can be both a financial opportunity and an emotional decision. Money sent home supports families, builds houses, finances businesses and, increasingly, goes into investments. Yet concerns about political instability, corruption, currency depreciation and weak institutions continue to discourage many potential investors.

Those concerns are not without basis. Africans in the diaspora have seen businesses fail, property disputes drag on and local currencies lose value against the dollar, pound and euro.

But there is a problem with treating those experiences as evidence that investing in Africa is inherently too risky.

Africa is not a single investment market.

The continent has 54 countries with different currencies, political systems, financial markets, regulations and economic structures. The risks facing an investor in Kenya are not necessarily the same as those facing an investor in Nigeria, Ghana, Rwanda or South Africa.

For anyone considering investing in Africa, that distinction is critical.

The African Development Bank estimates that remittances to Africa reached $104.8 billion in 2024. That makes Africans abroad an important source of capital for the continent, with money flowing into household spending, education, property, businesses and other activities.

The challenge is ensuring that more of that capital can be invested productively while protecting investors from avoidable losses.

Investing in Africa starts with choosing the right market

One of the biggest mistakes made by diaspora investors is approaching Africa as if it were one economy.

It is not.

South Africa has one of the continent’s deepest financial markets. Kenya has developed a strong digital-payments ecosystem and an active capital market. Egypt has a large domestic consumer market and substantial industrial capacity. Rwanda has positioned itself as a business-friendly investment destination.

Other countries face much greater challenges, including high inflation, foreign-exchange shortages, conflict, debt pressures or weak institutions.

The differences can be significant even between neighbouring countries.

UN Trade and Development said Africa attracted about $70 billion in foreign direct investment in 2025, the third-highest level since 1990. Although the figure was below the exceptional amount recorded in 2024, it remained about one-third above Africa’s long-term average.

Investment, however, remains concentrated in particular countries and sectors.

Energy, infrastructure, mining and critical minerals continue to attract large amounts of capital. Manufacturing and some service industries have struggled to attract the same level of investment in many markets.

For diaspora investors, economic growth alone is therefore not enough.

They need to identify where growth is happening, who is benefiting from it and whether their chosen investment is positioned to capture that growth.

Currency risk can reduce investment returns

Currency risk is among the most important issues for Africans investing from abroad.

An investor earning dollars, pounds or euros may see an attractive return in an African currency but discover that the gain is much smaller when converted back into foreign currency.

For example, a business could generate a strong return in Kenyan shillings while the shilling weakens against the pound during the same period. The business may have performed well, but the investor’s international return could still be disappointing.

The same principle applies across African emerging markets.

Currency movements are influenced by interest rates, inflation, imports, exports, commodity prices, government finances and global investor sentiment.

Diaspora investors should therefore examine the currency exposure of an investment before committing capital.

A company that earns dollars from exports may be better protected from local currency depreciation than a retailer whose revenues come entirely from domestic customers.

Property investors should also consider currency risk.

A rental property may generate attractive income in local currency but provide a much lower return when converted into dollars or euros.

The lesson is not that diaspora investors should avoid African currencies.

It is that currency movements need to form part of the investment calculation from the beginning.

Political risk does not tell the whole story

Political instability is often one of the first concerns raised by people considering investing in Africa.

Elections, protests, changes in government and disputes over public policy can affect businesses and financial markets.

But political headlines alone do not provide a complete picture of investment risk.

Investors should look at the institutions behind the politics.

Can contracts be enforced? Are property rights protected? Are tax rules predictable? Can companies access foreign exchange? How quickly are commercial disputes resolved?

The International Monetary Fund has identified global financial conditions, the strength of the U.S. dollar, governance and political risk as important factors affecting African economies and their access to external financing.

This also shows why African investment risk cannot be considered in isolation.

A change in U.S. interest rates can affect African borrowing costs. A fall in commodity prices can weaken an exporter’s revenues. Global geopolitical tensions can change the movement of capital into emerging markets.

Some risks affecting African investments originate outside Africa.

Family connections can create investment risk

For many African diaspora investors, family is the first point of contact when looking for an investment opportunity.

That can be an advantage.

A relative living locally may understand the property market, know potential business partners or identify opportunities that are invisible to an investor living overseas.

The problem begins when personal trust replaces financial controls.

Some investors send money to relatives to buy land or build rental property without independently checking ownership documents. Others provide capital to family businesses without formal shareholder agreements, financial statements or clear arrangements for distributing profits.

When relationships remain strong, the arrangement can appear to work.

When problems emerge, recovering the money can become extremely difficult.

Diaspora investors should establish ownership and responsibilities before committing funds.

They should know whose name appears on a property title, who owns the business, who controls the bank account and who is authorised to make financial decisions.

Formal agreements are not a sign of distrust.

They are a way of protecting both the investment and the relationship.

Why African property investment needs caution

Real estate remains one of the most popular forms of African investment among the diaspora.

Property is tangible and relatively easy to understand. Investors can see the building, rent it out and potentially benefit from long-term appreciation.

But property investment in Africa comes with its own risks.

Land ownership must be verified. Planning regulations need to be understood. Construction costs can change. Rental demand may not match expectations. Maintenance, taxes and management costs can reduce returns.

There is also a major difference between owning property and being able to sell it quickly.

Unlike publicly traded shares, real estate can take months to sell. During a weak property market, the process can take even longer.

Investors should therefore calculate the full cost of buying, developing, maintaining and eventually selling a property.

A low purchase price does not automatically make a property a good investment.

The emotional side of diaspora investment

Financial decisions become more complicated when family and identity are involved.

Many Africans abroad want their investments to create jobs, support relatives or contribute to communities where they grew up.

Those goals can be positive.

But they can also make it difficult to make purely financial decisions.

An investor may continue financing an underperforming business because relatives depend on it. Another may hold onto a property that generates poor returns because selling it would disappoint the family.

This is where investment and financial support need to be separated.

If the purpose of sending money is to support a relative, it should not necessarily be treated as a commercial investment.

If the money is an investment, the same standards should apply as they would when investing in a business owned by someone outside the family.

That distinction can prevent years of financial frustration.

Where the biggest African investment opportunities are emerging

The African investment landscape is changing.

For decades, international investors largely associated Africa with oil, gas, mining and large infrastructure projects. Those industries remain important, but opportunities are expanding into technology, digital payments, renewable energy, logistics, manufacturing, healthcare and consumer services.

UN Trade and Development has identified energy, logistics, infrastructure and critical minerals among the sectors attracting significant investment.

For Africans living abroad, this creates an additional advantage.

Diaspora investors often understand both African and international markets.

A technology professional in Europe may bring international experience to an African software company. A financial professional in North America may help a growing business improve its accounting and governance. A logistics specialist in the Middle East may identify opportunities created by expanding trade routes.

Capital is only part of the value the diaspora can bring.

Knowledge, networks and management expertise can be just as important.

Due diligence is essential before investing in Africa

Africa’s economic outlook has improved in several areas, but investors still need to assess individual risks carefully.

The IMF said sub-Saharan Africa grew about 4.5% in 2025, its strongest pace in more than a decade. Inflation also eased in many economies.

But economic growth does not guarantee that every business or investment will succeed.

Governments still face debt and financing pressures. African economies remain exposed to commodity-price changes, geopolitical tensions and global financial conditions.

For an individual investor, due diligence is therefore essential.

Before investing in Africa, investors should verify ownership documents, examine financial statements, understand tax obligations and research the regulatory environment.

For larger transactions, independent lawyers, accountants and valuation professionals can help identify problems before money is committed.

Investors should also establish an exit strategy.

How will the investment be sold?

How long could it take?

Can profits legally be transferred abroad?

What happens if the local currency loses 20% of its value?

What happens if the business fails?

These questions may seem basic, but they can prevent expensive mistakes.

The diaspora has a major role in Africa’s investment future

The scale of money moving from the African diaspora to the continent shows how important diaspora capital has become.

The African Development Bank’s $104.8 billion remittance estimate for 2024 represents more than money sent home for household expenses. It also points to a large pool of capital that could potentially support businesses, housing, infrastructure and other productive activities.

Unlocking that potential will require changes on both sides.

African governments can make investing easier by strengthening property rights, improving land records, simplifying regulations, deepening capital markets and making tax rules more predictable.

Banks and investment companies can develop transparent financial products specifically for diaspora investors.

Diaspora investors, meanwhile, need to approach African investment with the same discipline they would apply anywhere else.

They should not assume that an investment is good simply because it is in their home country.

Nor should they reject an opportunity simply because it is in Africa.

Africa is risky. So is everywhere else.

The debate over African investment often gets stuck between two extremes.

One side sees a continent full of untapped opportunities and assumes rapid economic growth will eventually reward almost everyone.

The other sees political instability, weak currencies and governance problems and concludes that the safest option is to keep money abroad.

Neither view is particularly useful.

There are excellent businesses in difficult markets. There are poorly managed companies in fast-growing economies. There are property investments that look attractive but produce weak returns. There are businesses that can benefit from currency depreciation because they earn foreign exchange.

The important distinction is not whether Africa is risky.

It is whether the investor understands the risk.

For the diaspora, investing in Africa should not mean taking a leap of faith.

It should mean identifying a specific market, understanding the business, checking the legal structure, calculating the currency exposure and deciding whether the potential return justifies the risk.

Africa does not need its diaspora to ignore risk.

It needs investors who understand it.

And for those willing to do the work, that difference could determine whether billions in diaspora capital simply supports consumption or becomes a foundation for long-term African wealth.

Inside the AU’s quiet push to reshape Africa’s regional trade blocs

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Inside the AU’s quiet push to reshape Africa’s regional trade blocs

The African Union (AU) is seeking to reshape how Africa’s regional trade blocs work together, as governments push to turn the continent’s fragmented markets into a more integrated economic system.

The effort is centred on the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), the continent’s main framework for reducing trade barriers and creating a single African market for goods and services.

Rather than replacing existing regional economic communities, the AU is seeking to make them work more closely with AfCFTA. The approach could determine how quickly Africa achieves its long-standing goal of increasing intra-African trade and building stronger regional supply chains.

Africa’s regional trade blocs

Africa has eight AU-recognised Regional Economic Communities (RECs), including the East African Community (EAC), Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), Southern African Development Community (SADC) and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

These organisations have helped establish customs arrangements, common markets and transport corridors across neighbouring countries.

But overlapping memberships, different tariff structures, customs procedures and national regulations have also created challenges for companies trading across regional borders.

The AU views the regional economic communities as building blocks for continental economic integration.

The AfCFTA is intended to provide the wider framework linking those markets.

AfCFTA drives continental integration

The African Continental Free Trade Area entered into force in 2019, with trading under the agreement beginning in January 2021.

The agreement seeks to create a single African market, increase the movement of goods and services, encourage investment and address some of the problems caused by overlapping regional trade arrangements.

The AU says AfCFTA covers all 55 African countries, more than 1.3 billion people and a combined economy of about $3.4 trillion.

Despite that potential, intra-African trade remains relatively low compared with Africa’s trade with the rest of the world.

The AU has said intra-African trade accounts for roughly 16%-18% of the continent’s total trade, highlighting the scale of the opportunity if barriers between African markets can be reduced.

Why regional integration matters

For African manufacturers and exporters, tariffs are only one part of the problem.

Businesses also face lengthy border procedures, poor transport infrastructure, inconsistent product standards, limited access to trade finance and difficulties making cross-border payments.

Those costs can make it more expensive for an African company to sell to a neighbouring country than to import similar products from outside the continent.

The AU’s strategy therefore goes beyond reducing tariffs.

It includes efforts to harmonise regulations, improve customs systems, strengthen transport infrastructure and develop digital systems that can make cross-border trade faster and cheaper.

East Africa offers a key test

The East African Community provides one example of the opportunities and challenges facing regional integration.

The bloc brings together Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Rwanda, Somalia, South Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda.

EAC governments have made progress in removing some trade barriers, but businesses continue to report delays at borders and other administrative obstacles.

The bloc has been working on digital customs systems, electronic cargo tracking and other measures intended to reduce the time and cost of moving goods between member states.

The EAC is also seeking greater coordination between its regional trade commitments and AfCFTA.

Such coordination could eventually allow companies operating in East Africa to access a much larger continental market under more predictable rules.

The Tripartite Free Trade Area

Another important element of Africa’s regional trade strategy is the Tripartite Free Trade Area, which brings together COMESA, the EAC and SADC.

The three regional blocs cover a large part of eastern and southern Africa and include some of the continent’s biggest economies and most important transport corridors.

The Tripartite agreement is intended to reduce barriers between the three regions and create a larger market for businesses.

The AU’s support for both the Tripartite Free Trade Area and AfCFTA reflects its broader strategy of connecting existing regional markets rather than creating a completely new system.

West Africa faces political challenges

West Africa presents a more complicated picture.

Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger have withdrawn from ECOWAS following political disputes with the regional organisation after military takeovers in the three countries.

The three states have established the Alliance of Sahel States, creating a separate political and security framework.

The development has raised questions about the future of economic integration in West Africa.

However, the economic links created by ECOWAS remain important. Trade routes, labour movement and cross-border communities cannot easily be separated from political developments.

The situation demonstrates the difficulty of building a continent-wide trade system while political relationships between neighbouring governments remain fluid.

Digital trade and payments

Africa’s economic integration is also increasingly moving into the digital economy.

The Pan-African Payments and Settlement System, developed with Afreximbank, is designed to make cross-border payments between African countries easier and reduce the need to rely on external currencies for some transactions.

Digital trade systems could help address another major obstacle facing African businesses: the cost and complexity of conducting transactions across multiple jurisdictions.

Improved digital customs, electronic certificates and interoperable payment systems could eventually make it easier for small and medium-sized African businesses to enter regional markets.

The economic prize

The potential benefits of deeper African economic integration extend beyond trade.

Larger markets could help African manufacturers achieve economies of scale, attract investment and develop regional value chains.

Industries such as automotive manufacturing, pharmaceuticals, textiles, agriculture and food processing could benefit from production networks that span several African countries.

A more integrated market could also strengthen Africa’s bargaining position in global trade negotiations and reduce the continent’s dependence on imported manufactured goods.

But achieving those gains will require governments to implement commitments already made under AfCFTA and regional agreements.

Implementation is the biggest challenge

The AU’s push faces a familiar problem: Africa has no shortage of trade agreements, but implementation has often lagged behind political commitments.

Removing tariffs without addressing roads, ports, border procedures, regulations and payment systems will have limited impact.

Governments must also be willing to align national policies with regional and continental commitments.

For businesses, the test will be whether trade becomes measurably easier and cheaper.

For the AU, the challenge is to coordinate regional organisations that have different priorities, memberships and levels of economic integration.

Africa’s next trade frontier

The AU’s strategy is therefore not simply about creating another trade agreement.

It is an attempt to connect Africa’s existing regional trade blocs through a common continental framework.

The success of AfCFTA will ultimately depend on what happens beyond diplomatic meetings and official declarations: at border posts, ports, factories, warehouses and digital payment platforms.

If governments can reduce non-tariff barriers and align regional rules, Africa could move closer to a genuinely integrated continental market.

The prize would be a larger market for African businesses, stronger regional supply chains and greater opportunities for investment and industrialisation.

For the African Union, the task now is to turn the continent’s overlapping trade blocs from a source of fragmentation into the foundation of a single African market.

No Dry Ground, No Training: How Climate Change Is Changing Life for Mathare Footballers

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No Dry Ground, No Training: How Climate Change Is Changing Life for Mathare Footballers

Play. Dream. Repeat. For decades of young footballers growing up in Nairobi’s Mathare area, these three words have served as a mantra. Pick up a ball. Find a pitch. Play. But for many young players in Mathare, access to a playable pitch is becoming increasingly difficult.

Earlier this year, data provided to The Footy Guru flagged the severe impacts climate change is already having on grassroots football communities across Mathare. Erratic weather, flooding, and poor playing conditions are all threatening young footballers’ ability to train, play matches, and reach their full potential. Whereas serious weather events may have only interrupted seasons sporadically in years past, today they’re presenting problems that communities face with growing regularity.

If you’re playing football and chasing your next chance, climate change is becoming an opponent you can’t kick past.

Playing While the Rain Falls

Consistency matters in grassroots football. Players improve by attending training, playing in weekend matches, and spending hours upon hours perfecting their craft on their local pitches. But when fields in Mathare become waterlogged from heavy rains, all of that consistency comes into question, and it throws the schedule and prediction markets into chaos at the best betting sites ranked on Bettingtop10.ke.

After heavy rains, floodwaters can linger on playing fields for days—if the water ever recedes at all. Matches get postponed. Training sessions are canceled. Pitches become rutted and uneven, making practices unsafe for players. The result? Young players—who need every training session they can get—are losing days on the pitch. Climate scientists and advocated have warned for several years that extreme rainfall will ramp up as Earth heats up. Urban areas are often the most vulnerable.

Flooding in Mathare

Mathare is prone to flooding. Before the pandemic, entire neighborhoods in Mathare regularly faced the realities of intense rainfall, and flooding. One study highlighting the impact of flooding in Mathare noted:

“Flooding remains one of the perennial problems that face communities living in the Mathare Valley settlement…”

But for footballers who live in Mathare, flooding isn’t confined to the streets surrounding the pitches they play on.

“A few years ago, I remember there was a lot of rain around the time of the Kenya Cup season.” Mathare United player Absalah Wasige mentioned.

“Games were being played and paused because the grounds were so hard. We ended up losing so many games through this.”

Often, it comes from flooding on football pitches. Playing fields without proper drainage become bogged down by excess rainwater. Days of rain can leave goalposts surrounded by puddles. Training cones roll into drains. Players may be

Muddy Shoes and Missed Opportunities

Of course, it’s never just about muddy shoes and muddy pitches. Football creates opportunities for young people all over Kenya to pursue their dreams. Whether players are seeking scholarships, hoping to catch a scout’s eye, or working toward getting into an academy or a professional team, every day on the pitch is an opportunity to achieve their goals.

When players lose training sessions to canceled practices, they lose time to develop their skills. At their worst, heavy rains can impact entire youth leagues by preventing access to playable fields.

“It’s a new opponent,” Absalah said.

Grassroots football has always been about facing tough opponents. Whether that’s the team you’re playing against, preventing injury, or grappling with unpredictable expenses, football at the grassroots level is a test of players and coaches alike. However, climate change is proving to be a new opponent that the world has to contend with besides controversial referees.

Climate Change vs. Football: The Battle for Mathare

Mathare isn’t alone in feeling the effects of climate change. Football teams around the world are experiencing firsthand how shifting rain patterns, weather events, and changing temperatures impact players and their ability to play the game they love.

A recent report exploring football and climate change indicated that weather and climate impacts are increasingly affecting “how, where, when and if people play, learn and watch football.” Football communities around the world are grappling with these changes on a daily basis—whether they realize it or not. And in Mathare, Kenya, those trends are hitting home.

Players are learning to play in conditions their parents never did. Coaches are factoring the weather into practice and game plans. Teams are encountering hurdles when scheduling tournaments and matches.

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